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ABSTRACT
Discriminatory channel estimation emerges as a promis-
ing method of not only increasing the secrecy rates in
conventional wiretap channels, but also providing a valuable
tool for solving the authentication problem. In this paper,
we revisit the discriminatory channel estimation method by
Chang et al. and propose a generalization to the challenging
scenario in which the number of antennas at the legitimate
receiver equals or exceeds those of the transmitter. The
proposed method is based on the simple idea of dividing
the receiver antennas into smaller groups. However, the
direct application of previous approaches would result into
security problems due to the multiple observations of the
eavesdropper, and therefore the transmission system needs to
be designed taking this fact into account. The performance
of the proposed technique is illustrated by means of some
numerical examples, which clearly show the feasibility of
discriminatory channel estimation even in the case of sys-
tems with more antennas at the receiver side.
Index Terms— Discriminatory channel estimation
(DCE), multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), physical
layer security,
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of wireless communications has increased in
the last years due to the amazing achievements in terms of
reliability and data rate. Unfortunately, the broadcast nature
of these communications makes extremely easy the intercep-
tion of (maybe encrypted) data, which suggests the need of
improvements in terms of security. In particular, physical
layer security methods address the security problem [1]
without imposing any restriction on the computing power of
potential attackers, thus providing information-theoretically
secure communications. This promising paradigm has trig-
gered many interesting works on the application of physical
layer security techniques [2]–[6].
This paper focuses on Discriminatory Channel Estima-
tion (DCE), which is based on the discrimination between
a legitimate receiver (Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve), by
taking into account the quality of their channel estimates.
Thus DCE can be seen as a promising tool for improving
the secrecy rates in conventional wiretap channels, where
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the degradation of the channel state information (CSI) at the
eavesdropper is expected to result in additional opportunities
for the legitimate pair (Alice and Bob) [3]. Moreover, DCE
also emerges as a key technique for addressing authentication
problems, where the quality of the channel estimates can be
very helpful in order to identify potential attackers.
Previous DCE approaches include the work by Chang et
al. who proposed a multistage training-based channel estima-
tion scheme in [4]. In the first stage, a preliminary estimation
of Bob’s channel is obtained. In the following stages Bob
sends back his estimate, which is iteratively refined, while
artificial noise (AN) is superimposed in the null space of
Bob’s channel to degrade the estimates at the eavesdropper.
Moreover, in order to reduce the overhead, Chang et al.
proposed other design based on a two-way training method
[7], in which both transmitter and receiver transmit pilots.
Recently, Yang et al. proposed another two-way training
method [8], which uses the whitening matrix of the channel
between the legitimate receiver and the transmitter. However,
the previous techniques require a number of antennas at the
transmitter side larger than the number of antennas at Bob’s,
due to the need of a null space for superimposing AN.
In this paper, we focus on the original DCE technique in
[4] with only two training stages, and remove the assumption
on the number of antennas at Alice. In particular, we propose
a general method which is based on the grouping of Bob’s
antennas and the transmission of AN in the null-subspace of
each group. This simple idea results in a far from trivial
design due to the availability of several training signals
at the eavesdropper. Therefore, following a conservative
approach, we assume an optimal fusion of the signals at
the eavesdropper, and design the transmission scheme in
order to provide accurate estimates of the legitimate channel,
while guaranteeing a sufficiently poor performance of the
eavesdropper channel estimator.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PROPOSED
SCHEME
We consider the traditional wiretap system model [2]
in Fig. 1, consisting on three wireless MIMO nodes: a
transmitter Alice who wish to establish a communication
with a legitimate receiver Bob, while an eavesdropper Eve
is trying to tap the transmission. The number of antennas at
each node is NA, NB and NE respectively.
There are two stages of transmission:
Fig. 1: Considered scenario. MIMO wiretap channel.
• In the first stage, and analogously to [4], only
training sequences are transmitted.
• In the second stage, the antennas at Bob’s are
considered in smaller independent groups, and the
stage is divided in as many turns as groups has
been formed. In each turn, Alice injects artificial
noise on the null-subspace of the corresponding
channel group. In this manner, and without affecting
Bob’s, the channel estimates at Eve’s are seriously
degraded.
Let us finally point out that the proposed scheme can be
seen as a generalization of the technique in [4]. In particular,
when the size of groups is equal to NB , the proposed scheme
reduces to the technique in [4] and is able to cover the case
with NA > NB .
II-A. First Stage: Conventional Training
The first stage, which takes T0 channel uses, simply
consists of the transmission of the training sequence X0 ∈
CT0×NA . Thus, the signals received by Bob and Eve are
Bob: Y0 = X0H + W0
Eve: Z0 = X0G + V0
where the channel and noise matrices are defined in Table
I. Likewise, the training matrix X0 is defined as
X0 =
√
P0T0
NA
C0 (1)
where P0 is the training signal power in the first stage, and
C0 ∈ CT0×NA is a training matrix satisfying CH0 C0 = INA .
From its received signal Y0, Bob obtains a preliminary
channel estimate of H, denoted by Ĥ0 , H + ∆H0, which
is sent back to the transmitter. By applying the LMMSE
criterion, Ĥ0 is given by
Ĥ0 = σ2HX
H
0
(
σ2HX0X
H
0 + σ
2
wIT0
)−1
Y0. (2)
H ∈ CNA×NB
MIMO channel from Alice to Bob. The elements of
H are random circular uncorrelated variables, with
zero mean and variance equal to σ2H .
G ∈ CNA×NE
MIMO channel from Alice to Eve. The elements of
G are random circular uncorrelated variables, with
zero mean and variance equal to σ2G.
W0 ∈ CT0×NB
AWGN matrix at Bob in the first stage, with variance
equal to σ2w.
V0 ∈ CT0×NE
AWGN matrix at Eve in the first stage, with variance
equal to σ2v.
Table I: Definition of channel and noise matrices.
Analyzing the error ∆H0 we can obtain the correlation
matrix
E
{
∆H0(∆H0)
H
}
= NB
(
1
σ2H
INA +
P0T0
NAσ2w
CH0 C0
)−1
= NB
(
1
σ2H
+
P0T0
NAσ2w
)−1
INA (3)
and therefore, the normalized MSE (NMSE) of the prelimi-
nary channel is given by
NMSE0B =
Tr
(
E
{
∆H0(∆H0)
H
})
NANB
=
(
1
σ2H
+
P0T0
NAσ2w
)−1
.
(4)
II-B. Second Stage: Artificial Noise and Training Signals
Given the channel estimate Ĥ0, Alice can design the
training sequence of the second stage, superimposing AN
to the training matrix X1. In particular, and unlike [4],
Bob’s antennas are divided into independent groups of Nrx
antennas, being Nrx < NA. Accordingly, we define the
number of turns in which this stage is divided, nturn, as well
as the length of the training matrix in each turn, T turn1 . Thus,
assuming for notational simplicity that NB is a multiple of
Nrx,1 we have
nturn =
NB
Nrx
, T turn1 =
T1
nturn
. (5)
In each of these turns, Alice transmits a signal with AN
in the null subspace of the channel to the corresponding Nrx
receiving antennas. At the end of the two stages, the signals
received by Bob are
Y = (C̄ + Ā)H +

W0
W1
...
Wnturn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
W̄
, (6)
1The generalization to the case of NB
Nrx
/∈ N is straightforward.
with
C̄ =

√
P0T0
NA
C0√
P1T1
NAnturn
C1,1
...√
P1T1
NAnturn
C1,nturn
 , Ā =

0
A1NHĤ0,1
...
Anturn N
H
Ĥ0,nturn
 ,
(7)
where C1,m ∈ CT
turn
1 ×NA is a unitary training matrix, and
P1 is the power allocated to the training signals of the entire
second stage. Hence, P1nturn is the power corresponding to each
turn. Am ∈ CT
turn
1 ×(NA−Nrx) is the AN matrix with variance
σ2A, and NĤ0,m ∈ C
NA×(NA−Nrx) is the null subspace of the
m-th group of receiving antennas.
Finally, defining w = vec(W̄) and h = vec(H), the
vectorization of (6) yields
y = (INB ⊗ C̄)h + (INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0 + (INB ⊗ Ā)∆h + w, (8)
where the term (INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0 6= 0 due to the fact that NH0
is only orthogonal to the space defined by the group of Nrx
antennas used in its respective turn. Moreover, let us point
out that the first and second terms are uncorrelated due to
the independence between C̄ and Ā.
III. COVARIANCE MATRIX STRUCTURE AND
FINAL CHANNEL ESTIMATES
This section provides the final channel estimates, which
require the careful analysis of the involved covariance and
cross-covariance matrices.
III-A. Covariance matrix structure
From (8), it is easy to write
Chy =σ2H
(
INB ⊗ C̄
H
)
(9)
Cyy =σ2H(INB ⊗ C̄C̄
H
) + σ2wINB(T0+T1)
+ E
{(
(INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0
)(
(INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0
)H}
+ E
{(
(INB ⊗ Ā)∆h
) (
(INB ⊗ Ā)∆h
)H}
,
(10)
where the two last terms of Cyy require a more detailed
analysis. In particular, the term
E
{(
(INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0
)(
(INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0
)H}
(11)
models the effect of the AN on the antennas not belonging
to the group for which it was designed. Thus, defining
f =
(
(INB ⊗ Ā)ĥ0
)
=
[
fT1 , f
T
2 , . . . , f
T
NB
]T
(12)
we have that fm ∈ C(T0+T1)×1 is given by
fm = Āĥ0,m =

0T0×1
A1NHĤ0,1ĥ0,m
A2NHĤ0,2ĥ0,m
...
Anturn N
H
Ĥ0,nturn
ĥ0,m
 , (13)
where ĥ0,m is the m-th column of Ĥ0, that is, the preliminary
estimate of the multiple-input single-output (MISO) channel
from Alice to the m-th receive antenna. Here, it is important
to note that the first T0 entries are zero due to the absence of
AN in the first stage. Moreover, among the nturn vectors with
length T turn1 corresponding to each group of antennas, exactly
Nrx of them will be zero due to the orthogonality between
the AN and the channel of the corresponding group of
antennas. Hence, the covariance matrix Cff , whose structure
is illustrated in Figure 2a, consists of N2rx matrices given by
E
{
fm1 f
H
m2
}
=
[
0T0×T0 0T0×T1
0T1×T0 Mm1,m2
]
, (14)
where m1,m2 = 1, 2, . . . , nturn, and Mm1,m2 is a block-
diagonal matrix where the n-th block of the diagonal is given
by
Bfn = σ
2
A(NA −Nrx)Tr
(
NH
Ĥ0,n
ĥ0,m1 ĥ
H
0,m2NĤ0,n
)
IT1/NB ,
(15)
with n = 1, 2, . . . , NB . In words, matrix Cff models
spurious effects (not present in the original method in [4])
due to the inner products between the projections (onto the
estimated null subspace of each antenna group) of a pair of
MISO channel estimates.
The analysis of the last term in (10) is simpler and
follows the lines in [4]. In particular, defining
k = ((INB ⊗ Ā)∆h) =
[
kT1 ,k
T
2 , . . . ,k
T
NB
]T
, (16)
we have
km =

0T0×1
A1NHĤ0,1∆hm
A2NHĤ0,2∆hm
...
Anturn N
H
Ĥ0,nturn
∆hm
 . (17)
where ∆hm represents the error in the preliminary estimate
of the m-th MISO channel.
Analogously to the previous case, Ckk (Figure 2b) is
formed by N2rx matrices E
{
km1k
H
m2
}
with the same struc-
ture as (14). However, in this case the expectation will be
null for m1 6= m2, whereas for m1 = m2 we have block-
diagonal matrices with the n-th block given by
Bkn = σ
2
A(NA −Nrx)2NBNMSE0BIT1/NB (18)
with n = 1, 2, . . . , NB .
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Structure of covariance matrices. Example with
NA = 4, NB = 6, NE = 5, Nrx = 2, T0 = T1 = 150
(a) Matrix Cff , (b) Matrix Ckk
III-B. Final Channel Estimates
Given the covariance and cross-covariance matrices, the
final estimate of the legitimate channel is
ĥ1 = ChyC−1yy y. (19)
In the case of Eve, we have a similar result for the
preliminary channel estimate
Ĝ0 = σ2GX
H
0
(
σ2GX0X
H
0 + σ
2
vIT0
)−1
Z0. (20)
and the NMSE after the first stage can be computed through
the error matrix ∆G = Ĝ0 −G as in eq. (4), obtaining
NMSE0E =
(
1
σ2G
+
P0T0
NAσ2v
)−1
. (21)
However, in the second stage Eve has to modify her
estimate to take into account the channel training strategy.
In this stage, the covariance and cross-covariance matrices
at Eve’s are computed following the lines in the previous
subsection. Thus, Cgz is equivalent to (9), whereas Czz is
given by the sum of the first two terms of (10), related to data
training and AWGN noise matrices, and a term involving the
product between AN and the channel estimate Ĝ. Unlike
Bob’s case, the terms in the diagonal of this last term are
not zero because the AN is not orthogonal to G. As a result,
Eve’s estimates are obtained as
Ĝ = NEσ2GC̄
H
(
NEσ
2
GC̄C̄
H
+ RV̄
)−1
Z , G + ∆G.
(22)
where
RV̄ =
[
NEσ
2
vIT0 0
0 NE
(
(NA −Nrx)σ2Aσ2G + σ2v
)
IT1
]
.
(23)
Finally, due to the independence between the AN sub-
spaces and the eavesdropper channel G, the estimate at Eve’s
can be seen as a simple average of the estimates in each turn.
Hence, the minimum NMSE achievable at Eve is γnturn , where
γ is the limit imposed to each Eve’s estimate [4].
Fig. 3: NMSE performance in function of Nrx (NA =
4, NB = 6, NE = 5).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The performance of the proposed technique is illustrated
in this section by means of some numerical results. Only
scenarios with NB ≥ NA are represented, thus focusing
on the gap left by the original technique proposed in [4].
In all the simulations the transmitter (Alice) have four
antennas, Bob has six antennas, and Eve has five antennas
(NA = 4, NB = 6, NE = 5). We consider i.i.d Rayleigh
channels H and G constant along the whole training phase.
Training sequence lengths are assumed equal in both stages
T0 = T1 = 150, where T1 refers to the whole second stage,
which is later divided into nturn turns. The minimum Eve’s
achievable NMSE is defined as γ, which is a lower bound
imposed on the NMSE of Eve. The average transmission
power is 30 dBm (Pave = 1), P0, P1 and σA are designed
according to the power allocation scheme in [4], with an
optimization problem solved by a simple one-dimensional
line search. The SNR of the channels is defined as
SNRB =
E
{
‖X0H‖2F
}
+ E
{
‖X1H‖2F
}∑nturn
k=0E {‖Wk‖2F }
=
1
σ2w
(24)
SNRE =
E
{
‖X0G‖2F
}
+ E
{
‖X1G‖2F
}∑nturn
k=0E {‖Vk‖2F }
=
1
σ2v
. (25)
Additionally, all our results are compared with the best
NMSE performance achievable by Bob in a transmission
without AN. This NMSE is given by
NMSElower bound =
(
1
σ2H
+
Pave(T0 + T1)
NAσ2w
)−1
. (26)
Figure 3 shows the NMSE of the channel estimate at
Bob’s as a function of SNR for different values of Nrx. In
particular, for γ = 0.1 the NMSE of the legitimate receiver is
similar to the best NMSE achieved in [4] (considering two-
stages and satisfying NA > NB). However, for γ = 0.001,
the NMSE obtained is close to NMSElower bound, which is
Fig. 4: NMSE performance in function of γ for NA =
4, NB = 6, NE = 5,SNR = 10dB
worthwhile since training sequence is divided into only two
stages. Here, we must point out that although these results
seem to suggest that the performance improves with the
size of the antenna groups, we have corroborated with other
experiments that this is not always the case, which is a good
motivation for a future study.
Figure 4 shows the NMSE performance as a function of
γ for a low SNR value (10dB) and for the largest feasible
antenna group size. We can see in the figure that when
γ < 10−3 (shaded zone of the figure), the limit imposed
to the eavesdropper is so low that Alice does not need
to transmit AN. That is, the proposed technique reduces
to conventional channel training. Higher SNRs has been
studied, observing that in this case, Alice always needs to
transmit AN in order to degrade Eve’s estimate. Therefore,
with high SNRs the advantage provided by the proposed
scheme is more noticeable.
Figure 5 shows the Bit Error Rate (BER) achieved by
Bob and Eve as a function of SNR for different values of
γ. The simulation is based on the transmission of uncoded
QPSK symbols and zero forzing equalization (channel inver-
sion by means of the pseudoinverse). As can be seen, Bob
reaches a lower BER than Eve in all considered scenarios,
which supports the idea of exploiting the proposed approach
to increase the achievable secrecy rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper extends the idea of discriminatory channel
estimation to the general case in which the number of
antennas at the legitimate receiver is not necessarily lower
than that of the transmitter. The basic idea, which consists
in the transmission of artificial noise on the null subspaces
of the channels to different subgroups of antennas, results in
far from trivial structures on the covariance matrices for the
linear minimum mean square error estimators. However, the
careful processing of the received signals allows us to ensure
that the legitimate pair can take advantage of the training
Fig. 5: BER performance in function of SNR for NA =
4, NB = 6, NE = 5
sequence design, thus guaranteeing an improved channel
estimation performance with respect to the eavesdropper.
The promising results of the proposed scheme have been
illustrated by means of several simulation examples. Future
research lines include the optimal selection of the antenna
group size.
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